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Abstract
In this paper we propose a novel trust establishment architecture fully com-
pliant with the ETSI ITS standard which takes advantage of the periodically
exchanged beacons (i.e CAM) and event triggered messages (i.e DENM). Our
solution, called T-VNets, allows estimating the traffic density, the trust among
entities, as well as the dishonest nodes distribution within the network. In ad-
dition, by combining different trust metrics such as direct, indirect, event-based
and RSU-based trust, T-VNets is able to eliminate dishonest nodes from all
network operations while selecting the best paths to deliver legal data messages
by taking advantage of the link duration concept. Since our solution is able to
adapt to environments with or without roadside units (RSUs), it can perform
adequately both in urban and highway scenarios. Simulation results evidence
that our proposal is more efficient than other existing solutions, being able to
sustain performance levels even in worst-case scenarios.
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1. Introduction
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have always been considered the key-
stone of Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS) [1]. Such com-
munication systems have been deployed mainly to enhance safety on roads and
to improve the passengers’ comfort. Similarly to other open and dynamic net-5
works, vehicular ad hoc networks suffer from different security threats [2], where
the most dangerous ones are those targeting safe message generation and dis-
semination.
Many solutions have been proposed to ensure a secure and trusted delivery
of such messages, as well as comfort messages. Nevertheless, finding a balanced10
tradeoff between security, efficiency, and network requirements remains an open
challenge. Furthermore, existing solutions for securing vehicular communication
can be divided into two categories: trust-based solutions and cryptography-
based solutions, including the standardized 1609.2 and ETSI ITS security mod-
els [3, 4]. Cryptography-based solutions are known to provide excellent results15
for most security needs. However, all solutions in this category generally focus
on outside attackers and introduce additional delays, limiting their usefulness
in highly dynamic and delay sensitive networks such as VANETs. Concern-
ing trust-based solutions for VANETs, which are based on economic science
[5], they have attracted the research community mainly because this security20
solution can ensure highly trusted communications while promoting low-delay
delivery without exhausting network resources.
Trust-based solutions for VANETs are generally classified into three cate-
gories: (i) entity-based, (ii) data-based, and (iii) hybrid solutions.
Entity-based works [6, 7, 8] attempt to eliminate dishonest nodes from all the25
network operations based on the exchanged recommendations between vehicles,
which are piggybacked in existing messages or directly sent within new indepen-
dent messages. In addition to the high time overhead introduced, works within
this category do not take message quality into account, and assume that the
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provider reputation is enough to secure communications, while in many cases30
honest nodes can also send or forward malicious messages [9, 10].
Since a stable reputation value for an unknown node is not feasible to achieve,
few approaches in the data-based category [11, 12] assume that data quality is
the only parameter allowing to secure all communications. These solutions typ-
ically compare exchanged data against a set of references representing data sent35
by an honest node. Obviously, this can represent an additional and costly delay
when using a large database, and it cannot avoid Distributed Denial of Ser-
vice (DDoS) attacks since attackers keep injecting packets resembling standard
traffic.
Although hybrid techniques [13, 14, 15] try to revoke dishonest nodes and40
discard malicious data, they also suffer from the aforementioned shortcomings.
In parallel with all VANET enhancements proposed in the literature, tremen-
dous efforts are also dedicated to standardize VANET communications. How-
ever, most of the existing solutions do not closely follow these standards.
In this paper, we propose a trust establishment scheme that uses C-ITS45
(Cooperative-Intelligent Transport Systems) messaging services CAM and DENM
to carry the values of the necessary metrics in order to provide: (i) fast and
trusted event message dissemination, (ii) continuous estimations of both traffic
density and dishonest nodes’ distribution within the network, and (iii) efficient
techniques to revoke dishonest nodes in a collaborative manner. Our solution50
works transparently to the specific environment, being effective both in urban
and freeway or highway scenarios, with or without RSU deployment. In addi-
tion, we propose a path selection technique which allows fast delivery of data
messages via the shortest trusted path.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the55
main existing trust-based solutions. In section 3 we provide an overview of our
proposal. Section 4 details the proposed solution. Afterward, in section 5, we
explain how the trust establishment can enhance the inter-vehicular communi-
cation data routing. In section 6 the simulation environment is described, and




Trust models can be seen as decision-based reputation systems [16]. They
have been inspired by economic science, and used afterward to enhance security
in many other fields, especially in communication networks [17].65
Many works have been proposed to provide trust management in VANETs,
and they are usually classified into entity-based [6, 7, 8, 18], data-based [19, 11,
12] and hybrid [13, 20, 21, 22, 14, 15] models, depending on the solution target.
In this section we describe the most recent and relevant works.
2.1. Entity-based trust models70
Entity-based trust models aim at excluding dishonest nodes from all net-
work operations, either temporarily or permanently. Most of the proposed
works within this subset adopt a technique to gather recommendations from
other nodes, usually by dividing vehicles on the road into different clusters or-
chestrated by a pre-selected clusterhead.75
Haddadou et al. propose an approach inspired on the incentive model of
banks [6]. It allows excluding malicious nodes based on a credit value, and
this value can be increased or decreased following the behavior of the node in
the network. However, it considers that the direct and indirect trusts are the
same, and it does not take into account the specificities of each situation to80
differentiate between messages.
Another trust and reputation model was proposed by Yang [7]. In this work,
messages are represented by a 4-tuple (identity, event type, latitude and longi-
tude, event time), and the vehicle by a 3-tuple (identity, vehicle type, vehicle ve-
locity). Similarity between nodes is computed based on the Euclidean distance,85
where each vehicle stores a weight called ”direct experience-based reputation”,
that is related to the messages’ producers, and another weight about recommen-
dations from vehicles from which they received the same messages. Although
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this scheme preserves a good events’ message quality, it has some shortcomings
since it only deals with event information. Moreover, the Euclidean distance90
cannot provide global information of similarities between two nodes. In addi-
tion, this scheme does not detail how to penalize nodes that have provided false
recommendations. The number of received recommendations, and the reliability
of the source of these recommendations, are a main concern as well.
Unlike [6, 7], Khan et al. [18] propose detecting dishonest nodes by comput-95
ing a distrust level of nodes. This level increases with node misbehavior. Using
the continuous observation of the neighborhood, every node sends a report about
its untrusted neighbors to the clusterhead, and then to the trusted authority
(TA), allowing to revoke nodes judged as untrusted. Nevertheless, authors did
not provide enough details about the communication steps of this approach. In100
addition, this solution seems less effective than other existing solutions in terms
of the overhead caused by node reports.
A different way to establish trust in VANETs was suggested by Jesudoss et
al. [23]. They propose stimulating truth-telling and cooperation among VANET
nodes through a Seller-Buyer scheme. Similarly to [24], they propose a cluster-105
ing technique to reduce the communication overhead. They assign a reputation
weight to all nodes participating in the clusterhead election and network con-
trol tasks by sharing their reports about the exchanged traffic. While showing
good detection rates, this scheme does not respect reference trust metrics such
as direct and indirect trust, and does not guarantee the privacy of vehicles.110
Moreover, high mobility levels can cause this scheme’s performance to decrease
considerably.
A solution focused on the routing process is proposed in [25]. It represents
an attempt to secure the GyTAR routing protocol [26] by establishing trust
among vehicles. To this end, authors propose an inter-cluster communication115
solution where the clusterhead is the only node responsible for evaluating the
trust level of different peers (i.e vehicles). The main concern about this work
is the way it deals with resource exhaustion by defining a threshold. If a node
exceeds this threshold, it will be considered dishonest. However, there is neither
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information about how clusterheads are selected, nor about how the threshold120
is adjusted. Moreover, this in-clusterhead centralization approach causes a high
delay, and the dangers associated to a malicious clusterhead emerge.
In [27] authors proposed a social contribution-based technique to stimulate
selfish nodes for being more cooperative. This solution is quite a hybridization
of works [23] and [25] where trusted vehicles with a higher number of successfully125
routed messages are the preferred next forwarders. These vehicles can also be
seen as nodes with a high message forwarding probability, as computed through
the number of exchanged beacons and data messages. A betrayal attack can eas-
ily be launched in this case since communications are centralized around vehicles
behaving legally at first. In addition, the problem with this approach is that the130
signal propagation model is not taken into account, thereby failing to consider
basic urban environment conditions in their experiments. This means that this
scheme cannot achieve the results shown when facing real environments.
The last scheme in the entity-based trust models category is represented
by an intrusion detection mechanism for vehicular networks proposed in [28].135
Based on a set of vehicles called guards, this technique tries to detect service-
oriented attacks. Every guard node remains in promiscuous mode to identify
misbehaving nodes within their guard zone; also, each guard cooperates with
other guards for managing shared zones. Regular vehicles will be categorized
into untrustworthy, uncertain, and trustworthy using predefined thresholds. Un-140
fortunately, and similarly to all cluster-based solutions, this approach fails in
the case of malicious guards.
2.2. Data-based trust models
In entity-based trust models the exclusion of dishonest nodes from any op-
eration can lead to the disconnection problem. The latter occurs when there145
are large gaps between vehicles due to a low number of vehicles or obstacles,
or due to node revocations because of an inappropriate dishonest or selfish be-
haviour. Since having a low vehicle density or obstacles cannot be prevented,
the idea of filtering malicious messages without revoking theirs sources seems
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worth considering in order to reduce the disconnection problem effect.150
Golle et al. [19] propose a classical scheme similar to signature-based so-
lutions. In this approach, any received message is compared with a model of
non-malicious messages in VANETs maintained by all nodes. If no resemblance
is signaled, then data will be dropped; otherwise, it will be forwarded. As a
signature-based scheme, the main drawback of this approach is the construction155
of a global model for trustable communications in VANETs.
A data-based trust model for Ad-hoc ephemeral networks is proposed in
[11], where the trust of any entity is fixed a priori depending on its role (e.g.
Trust(Police vehicles = 1; ordinary vehicles = 0.5)). The model uses different
trust metrics to determine the trust level of event reports. Then, it evaluates160
the evidences related to this event using Dempster-Shafer theory and Bayesian
inference. Nevertheless, this approach achieves a good performance just in the
case of non-redundant and abundant data, as required for the training phase.
Moreover, in highly dynamic and open environments such as VANETs, fixing
the trust level of entities represents another weakness of this approach, where165
a group of nodes can be controlled by a malicious entity to perform a colluding
attack.
Another event-related solution is proposed in [29] where authors implement
an intrusion-aware trust model based on three main steps: (i) computation of
a confidence value for each message coming from a unique source; (ii) for all170
messages describing a same event, a trust value is calculated using the confi-
dence information of step i; and (iii) accepting of rejecting the event message
depending on its trust value. Despite the high accuracy of this approach, it in-
troduces a high waiting delay, which is not acceptable when targeting VANET
safety applications, and it cannot perform adequately in sparse scenarios.175
Similarly to the three previous works, Gurung et al. propose an information-
oriented trust model called ”RMCU” [12] that also attempts to filter-out mes-
sages with low trust levels. This scheme consists of two components: (i) a mes-
sage classification scheme, and (ii) an information-oriented trust model. Using
the proposed message classification scheme, every vehicle can gather messages180
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describing a same event, and then divide them into two groups according to
differences in their reports using a predefined threshold. This entire processing
is done based on three metrics, which are content similarity, content conflict
and routing path similarity. Finally, the information-oriented trust model de-
termines which group of messages is effective, and then it allows discarding185
the opposite group. Unfortunately, this approach does not take into account
the high mobility inherent to VANETs, and its time complexity is high. In
addition, in the case of message sparsity, this scheme would not perform well.
2.3. Hybrid trust models
Trust models falling under this category aim at insuring reliable communi-190
cation between nodes in the face of hostile nodes, as well as malicious messages.
Most of the existing works adopt a clustering technique to minimize their com-
munication overhead [13, 20, 15, 24, 30], but these centralized solutions always
fail in the case of malicious clusterheads and under very dynamic urban scenar-
ios.195
Zhang et al. [13] propose a framework for message propagation and evalu-
ation. In this approach, and to minimize the number of exchanged messages,
authors adopt a clustering organization whereby messages are relayed only be-
tween cluster leaders. Upon receiving a message, a leader sends it to the cluster
members to gather their opinions about the message. Finally, based on the200
collected opinions and the blacklist sent by the certification authority (CA), the
leader can decide whether to relay the message. However, this scheme adds an
important overhead to messages as it aggregates trust opinions and node signa-
tures. It can be considered inefficient in the case of selecting a malicious cluster
leader, achieving bad results in the presence of betrayal attacks.205
TRIP [20], an infrastructure-based proposal supporting both trust and repu-
tation in the scope of vehicular ad hoc networks, makes a classification of nodes
into three different trust levels. In addition, authors associate a confidence level
to each message. By combining node categories, message confidence and recom-
mendations coming both from RSUs and nearby nodes, they compute a weight210
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called reputation score, which will be compared with three fuzzy sets (no trust,
+/-trust, trust). If the weight is in the first set, the message will be rejected. If
it is in the second one, the message will be accepted but not forwarded. Finally,
if it is in the last set, the message is accepted and then forwarded. However,
this model has some deficiencies associated to the number of recommendations215
required, and those situations where a fake set of recommendations is present;
also, authors do not detail how to choose the initial weights (α, β, γ) concerning
to direct previous experiences of nodes.
T-CLAIDS [14] is another work providing a trust-aware intrusion detection
solution for VANETs. This solution takes into account the density, mobility220
and the vehicles’ motion direction to perform an action, while maintaining a
probability vector of all actions. This probability vector will be updated in the
iterations that follow until convergence to a particular value is achieved, offering
an approximate representation of a global knowledge about the environment.
Unfortunately, even if this solution shows good results in the general case, it225
looks questionable in the case of unpredictable events. Also, the convergence
time may be very long in sparse cases since it will be hard to gather all the
information required to have a global view.
Sedjelmaci et al. [15] propose the use of three cooperative levels of intrusion
detection to evaluate messages: (1) Local knowledge based intrusion detection230
in every vehicle; (2) Collaborative detection performed by the clusterheads; and
(3) Global detection within the RSU. The latter is responsible for computing
a trust level for each vehicle. The main weaknesses of this approach are: (i)
the time needed for cluster creation and clusterhead election is excessive; (ii) in
urban environments the assumption about stable clusters is not realistic; and235
(iii) in the absence of RSUs there is no trust and, hence, even if the IDS detects
intrusions, there is no punishment for intruder nodes.
Bali and Kumar [24] propose a trust-based technique for secure cluster for-
mation and data dissemination in VANETs. The proposal is based on two
essential modules: sensing modules to gather information about vehicles traffic,240
and a cloud-based module responsible for computing vehicles’ trustworthiness
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depending on the gathered information. Despite the trusted cluster formation
and maintenance, this scheme has many limitations. A deep explanation must
be provided about the sensing module usefulness since its gathered information
is already included within the periodically exchanged messages. In addition,245
this scheme seems more focused on highway scenarios since it is difficult to have
stable clusters for long periods (about 140 seconds are required to create new
clusters and select the new clustersheads, according to the paper).
A cooperation-based scheme for managing alert propagation in VANET is
proposed in [30]. Authors define a typical communication model represented by250
a set of activity diagrams. This scheme is very similar to the work in [13], where
the clusterhead forwards the alert message only if its cluster members agree
about its validity, with the difference that decisions about message validity are
taken by comparing them against an adequate activity diagram. Unfortunately,
this solution inherits the same problems of [13].255
In addition to the cluster-based trust establishment, fully distributed and
hybrid trust models are available as well [31, 32, 33].
A trust-based scheme for message relaying was proposed in [31] based on a
modular architecture, trying to deal with different kinds of messages, including
control and safety ones, to ensure trusted and fast data delivery by only choos-260
ing trusted intermediate nodes as message relayers. Despite the obtained results
evidence this scheme’s efficiency, the performance levels achieved in urban en-
vironments significantly differ from those achieved in highways and freeways.
Haddadou et al. [32] propose a trust management scheme inspired on eco-
nomic science. The scheme, called (DTM2), has many features as it forces265
nodes to be helpful and cooperative within the network by establishing a com-
munication price. This price will be high in the case of misbehaving nodes, thus
limiting their participation in the network, while trustful nodes are rewarded.
Despite extensive simulations, and the high performance levels achieved, a clear
description of their adversary model should be provided in order to judge the270
performance under different types of attack, especially betrayal attacks where a
node behaves legally for a short period of time to gain the trust of other nodes,
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and then starts behaving illegally.
Unlike classical trust models, Rostamzadeh et al. [33] try to divide the map
into different areas, and the traffic into three categories: safety, infotainment,275
and third party services, such as inter-taxi communication. Their proposal,
called ”FACT”, is divided into two modules: admission and dissemination. In
addition, the message source should be known by piggybacking the identities
of all vehicles participating in the routing process. The admission module is
responsible for analyzing the messages using the traffic category and the path’s280
trust. If the degree of satisfaction is high, the dissemination module is respon-
sible of selecting a trusted path for the message. Unfortunately, this solution
adds a considerable overhead and processing delay. Moreover, authors do not
provide information about security performance.
Overall, it is clear that existing works are not standard-compliant solutions285
and have different drawbacks, suffering from considerable overhead, computa-
tion delay, and security problems associated to clustering, among others. Also
notice that most of them are specific to only one kind of information (safety
or comfort), and they are dedicated to either urban or freeway scenarios. In
addition, radio jamming DoS attacks are also among VANET’s main threats.290
However, except for the work in [11] and our previous work [31], existing trust-
based solutions did not consider this kind of adversary. Nevertheless, efficient
lightweight solutions at the medium access control (MAC) layer have been pro-
posed [34, 35, 36] to deal with such critical cases. Hence, we believe that existing
trust-based solutions can be easily extended to deal with jamming DoS attacks295
through the use of any of the above MAC-based solutions.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a trust establishment scheme based on
the ETSI standard that can ensure a fast, distributed, and collaborative security
framework supporting dishonest nodes’ revocation, malicious data filtering, and
DoS attack prevention. Moreover, we propose a real-time traffic estimation300
technique, and a novel procedure for routing messages.
Implementing our proposal makes T-VNets independent, scalable and able
to operate in conjunction with any other communications protocol merely by
11
Vehicle-to-vehicle trust RSU-to-vehicle trust 
Events trust estimation and 
dissemination  
Segments trust and traffic estimation 
Direct interactions 
Recommendations 





































Link duration estimation 









Global trust computation 
Figure 1: Proposed trust establishment architecture.
adding one or more of our solution’s trust metrics to its main path scoring
function, thereby achieving greater security and robustness.305
3. T-VNets architecture
In this work we propose T-VNets, a solution that provides trust establish-
ment over vehicular networks using ETSI ITS messaging services. Specifically,
based on the information carried by the periodical Cooperative Awareness Mes-
sages (CAM) and the event-triggered Decentralized Environmental Notification310
Messages (DENM), T-VNets can provide an efficient and continuous evaluation
of traffic, as well as the distribution of dishonest nodes within the network.
Figure 1 shows the trust establishment architecture defined by T-VNets.
Based on the different pieces of information collected, global trust relations are
built. We distinguish between two main kinds of trust: inter-vehicles trust, and315
RSUs-to-vehicles trust.
Nodes within the network can compute a trust value about the honesty level
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associated to the different interactions. Moreover, RSUs can be considered as a
trusted third authority from which nodes can receive both instant and histor-
ical behavior evaluations. The latter are called in-segment and historical RSU320
evaluations, and together are used to build trust between RSUs and vehicles.
Our solution takes advantage of the existing message format introduced by the
ETSI standard to estimate the events’ credibility, as well as the level of traffic on
the roads and the distribution of dishonest nodes. Finally, the aforementioned
features allow our framework to choose the most reliable, secure and shortest325
path to deliver legal data messages.
T-VNets trust establishment process is based on different modules, as shown
in figure 1. It starts by evaluating the direct interactions between vehicles. This
phase involves two modules: (1) the message analysis module, which accounts
for both the received messages quality and the reported events effectiveness, and330
(2) the watchdog module, which generates reports about the direct neighbours
collaboration in the different network operations. Simultaneously, whenever a
vehicle ’i’ observes a behaviour change regarding another vehicle ’j’, it broad-
casts either a positive or a negative recommendation about vehicle ’j’ taking as
reference a previously defined honesty threshold, which means that recommen-335
dations are not requested, but instead are automatically broadcasted whenever
a vehicle notices a positive or a negative behaviour change. The gathered rec-
ommendations about a vehicle ’j’ will later be combined in order to compute an
indirect trust evaluation for vehicle ’j’.
In parallel with the previous vehicle-to-vehicle trust evaluation, whenever a340
vehicle ’i’ encounters an RSU it delivers a report about its neighbours behaviour,
thus allowing the RSU to have a quasi-global view about all vehicles; this way,
the RSU will generate evaluations about both recent and historical behaviours
of vehicles called RSU-to-vehicle trust evaluation.
Afterward, both vehicle-to-vehicle and RSU-to-vehicle trusts are combined345
to compute a global trust evaluation for every neighbor ’j’. Such value will be
carried by CAM messages, and used later on to enhance both data and event
message delivery while respecting DENM message specifications.
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In sections that follow, we start by detailing how trust among vehicles can
be updated depending on both local knowledge and vehicle-to-vehicle recom-350
mendations. The module responsible for this task is the one associated with
label ’A’ in figure 1. The second part will be dedicated to explaining how the
presence of an RSU within communication range can enhance the trust com-
putation and prevent both coalition and platooning attacks, which is the task
of module ’B’. Third, we detail how global trust evaluation is computed using355
the two previous processes (module ’C’). In the fourth and fifth sections, which
refer to modules ’D’ and ’E’, we explain how T-VNets takes advantage of ETSI
ITS standardized CAM and DENM messages to enhance the inter-vehicle trust
establishment. Finally, module ’F’ is the one responsible for the trusted path
selection and data delivery.360
3.1. Trust metrics
T-VNets employs different trust metrics like direct, indirect, event-related
and RSU-based trust. Moreover, to take advantage of this variety of trust
metrics, we propose a message forwarding scheme that is effective both in the
presence and in the absence of RSUs, thereby providing a more flexible solution365
that is adaptable to different types of environments. In the following, the 8 used
metrics are listed with the same order of use.
• Qmsg(i, j): quality of messages; it is the data centric evaluation of a node
i about messages sent by another node j during a period of time.
• ETR(E, j): event’s trust; it can be defined as the degree of belief associated370
to an event ’E’ as reported by a node j.
• WDR(i, j): watchdog continuous evaluation, where every node partic-
ipates in surveying the network by analyzing the sending frequency of
neighboring messages .
• DTR(i, j): the direct trust evaluation upon an interaction between a375
pair of nodes (i, j). This metric is computed based on every node’s local
knowledge without external feedback.
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• ITR(i, j): unlike the direct trust evaluation, a node ’i’ computes the
indirect trust for another node ’j’ based on the opinions of network nodes
about this node ’j’, instead of i’s local knowledge.380
• SRSU(j): in-segment RSU evaluation is the evaluation of a roadside unit
about the behavior of a vehicle j within its current segment.
• HRSU(j): historical RSU evaluation, represents a global view about a the
trust of a vehicle ’j’ generated by the RSU using j’s different in-segments
evaluations.385
• GTR(i, j): the global trust evaluation given by a node i to another j
based on its overall behavior. This metric is the combination of all used
metrics.
3.2. Adversary model
In general, reputation and trust-based systems are susceptible to different390
types of attacks [2, 37]. However, in this paper, we focus on the active attacks
listed below:
• False alert: this occurs when a selfish or dishonest vehicle triggers an alert
about an nonexistent event.
• Message dropping attack: when a node does not collaborate in the message395
transmission process and behaves as a blackhole.
• Denial of service attack (DoS): we consider a resource exhaustion attack
by sending messages at a high frequency.
• Coalition and platooning attacks: where a set of dishonest nodes (or a set
of nodes controlled by a dishonest node) are moving together in order to400
avoid being detected, and to gain trust by providing similar reports about
nonexistent events.
This means that our adversary can be: (i) A sender of malicious messages
or regular messages injected at a high rate; (ii) A relay node that can act as
15
a blackhole or camouflages its illegal behavior by relaying packets through an405
untrusted path; or (iii) A coalition of senders and relays having illegal purposes.
4. Proposal details
For the sake of clarity, our proposal will be divided into five main parts, and
it employs the notations listed in table 1. In addition, we will be using Figure 2
as reference since it summarizes our adversary model and the different elements410
of our proposal.
Table 1: Notations used.
Notation Meaning
GTR(i, j) Global TRust Evaluation given by i to j
DTR(i, j) Direct interactions’ TRust given by i to j
ITR(i, j) Indirect (recommendation-based) TRust given by i to j
HRSU(j) RSU’s Historical trust evaluation of j
SRSU(j) RSU’s in-Segment trust evaluation of j
ETR(E, j) TRust of the Event E reported by j
Qmsg(i, j) Quality of the messages sent by j to i
WDR(i, j) i’s WatchDog Report about j’s cooperation behavior
α Honesty factor
β Dishonesty factor
δ Trust increment factor
µ Trust decrement factor
RL Role playing factor
ρ Message credibility factor
In subsections 4.1 and 4.2 we describe how direct and indirect inter-vehicles
trust (DTR, ITR) can be computed, as well as the calculation for in-segment
and historical RSU-to-vehicles trust (SRSU, HRSU)and then, how these metrics


























Figure 2: Adversary model, best path selection and routing different cases.
4.1. Vehicle-to-vehicle trust
Trust can be defined as a relation amoung entities based on the observation
of historical interactions or recommendations [38]. Hence, the two main trust
metrics are the direct interaction between every pair on nodes (i, j), and the
recommendations coming to i about j. In the subsections below we describe how420
our solution maintains and updates the direct trust DTR(i, j) and the indirect
trust ITR(i, j).
Figure 3 illustrates the used modules in this phase.
4.1.1. Direct trust (DTR)
In our case, DTR is the combination of the exchanged messages’ quality425
(Qmsg) and a continuous report about the neighbors’ degree of cooperation
within the network using a watchdog technique (WDR), where every node re-

















































Figure 3: Vehicle-to-vehicle trust modules.
Similarly to all other trust metrics used, the intial ’DTR’ value assigned by430
a node i to another node j is equal to 0.5, and it can vary from 0 to 1 depending
on j’s behavior according to equation 1.
DTR(i, j) = AV G
[
DTR(i, j), [(β ·Qmsg(i, j)) + (α ·WDR(i, j))]
]
(1)
Similarly to equation 6, α and β are two factors where (α + β = 1) and
(β > α). They are used to give more importance to directly exchanged messages
in a period of time compared to network collaborativity since we are evaluating435
the direct trust.
Moreover, every node evaluates its neighborhood and stores, for every neigh-
bor, some information such as the Packet Drop Ratio (PDR) and the Packet
Sending Ratio (PSR). In order to decide whether an ongoing attack is taking
place, we define both a high (THh) and low (THl) traffic threshold. Then, we440
compare the PDR and the PSR against these thresholds, updating the watchdog
report WDR(i, j) according to algorithm 1:
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Algorithm 1 Vehicles cooperation evaluation
1: INPUTS: PDR, PSR of a node j during a period of time.
2: OUTPUTS: Watchdog report updated.
3: if (PDR(j) ≥ THh ) then (DoS attack detected)
4: WDR(i, j)← 0;
5: else
6: if (PDR(j)/PSR(j) ≤ THl ) then (blackhole attack detected)




In this algorithm notice that µ is the trust decrement factor.
For Qmsg(i, j), since it is a direct interaction, all messages can be decrypted
and analysed. Hence, a data trustiness value can be obtained. The global445
messages’ trustiness in a period of time will be updated by i upon receiving a
message from j using equation 2:













’RL’ is an aditional factor (0 ≤ RL ≤ 0.5) assigned to vehicles playing a
specific role (police, ambulance, etc.); otherwise, RL = 0.450
Dishonest behaviors (malicious messages) will cause the trust level to be
multiplied by a factor β higher than the legal behavior factor α (legal messages),
because one of the main features of trustfulness is being hard to gain but easy
to lose (β > α).
4.1.2. Indirect trust (ITR)455
Indirect trust among vehicles is computed by gathering the vehicles’ rec-
ommendations about each other. Usually, voting-based techniques have a bad
impact on bandwidth usage. To avoid this unwelcome situation, all one-hop
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neighbor recommendations will take into account only in the initial step; once
the trust metrics are updated (after a small period of time), only trusted neigh-460
bor recommendations will be taken into consideration for indirect trust compu-
tation.
The indirect trust (ITR) given by a node i to another node j will be contin-




P recommendations about j
β ·
∑
N recommendations about j + α ·
∑
P recommendations about j
(3)
465
Similarly to the previous cases, dishonest behaviors (negative recommenda-
tion) will cause the trust value computed to be multiplied by a factor β that
is higher than the legal behavior factor α (positive recommendation), where
(β > α).
4.2. RSU-to-vehicle trust470
RSU deployment is considered a complex task under both freeway and urban
scenarios since RSU coverage is often affected by the presence of obstacles.
However, when communication is feasible, the RSU’s quasi global view about
the network can significantly enhance the trust establishment among vehicles.
Based on the periodic vehicle reports, an RSU can match the vehicles pseudo475
identity with their real identity since it can contact the certification authority.
Hence, the RSUs can generate and forward some reports about the vehicles’
historical behavior using their current pseudo-identities. In our case, we dis-
tinguish between two types of RSU reports: (i) RSU trust evaluation for the
current road segment, and (ii) RSU trust evaluation for the global historical480
data. The main aim of this distinction is preventing coalition and platooning
attacks. If we have a global idea about the past behavior of a node, we can
combine it with information about its behavior within the current segment, and
readily detect if it is participating in a coalition attack, or if it is part of a
platoon composed of dishonest members sending positive reports about each485
other.
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Figure 4: RSU-to-vehicle trust modules.
Figure 4 illustrates the used modules to compute both recent and historical
RSU evaluations.
After filtering out reports coming from dishonest nodes, an RSU can com-
pute a value representing the behavior of node j within its current road segment490
(SRSU(j)), and considering the time spent by the vehicle within that road seg-
ment. This time can be estimated using the segment’s length and the vehicles’
average speed, in addition to the traffic light waiting time. Equation 4 repre-





P reports about j
β ·
∑
N reports about j + α ·
∑
P reports about j
(4)
In addition, based on the different in-segment trust evaluation reports re-
ceived, an RSU can compute a global historical trust value concerning all nodes
since it is usually connected to other RSUs. This global historical trust for a
21
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Figure 5: Global trust computation.






P SRSUs about j
β ·
∑
N SRSUs about j + α ·
∑
P SRSUs about j
]
(5)
Factors α and β are also used in both equations 4 and 5 for the same purpose
as in the previous equations. In addition, when an RSU is available, every node
i sends a list containing the identities j of nodes assumed to be dishonest (∀
j /GTR(i, j) ≤ danger value). Otherwise, it broadcasts a positive or negative505
recommendation about j based on its trust value GTR(i, j).
4.3. Global trust computation
The global trust evaluation uses both vehicle-to-vehicle and RSU-to-vehicle
to evaluate a node j as illustrated in figure 5
Every node i can build a global trust view about any other node j in the510
presence, as well as in the absence, of an RSU within its communication range.
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We call this global trust evaluation GTR(i, j), and it will be updated periodi-
cally, although following a different procedure depending on whether nodes are
in the presence of an RSU or not. The procedures are the following:
When located within an RSU’s communication range, vehicles periodically515
receive both the historical (HRSU) and the in-segment (SRSU) behavioral trust
of all nodes within the same segment. This allows every vehicle to have a clear
idea about its direct and indirect neighborhood in order to prevent any kind
of dishonesty. Equation 6 shows the global vehicle-to-vehicle trust updating
process in the presence of an RSU:520
GTR(i, j) = β ·
[




AV G[ITR(i, j), HRSU(j)]
]
(6)
To benefit from the global view provided by the RSU, we give more impor-
tance to the instant direct (DTR) and in-segment trust (SRSU) evaluations,
instead of recommendations (ITR) and historical behaviour (HRSU). To this
end, we employ factors α and β, with (α + β=1) and (β > α).
Similarly, in the case of vehicles outside the communication range of an RSU,525
they can evaluate each other based on the direct and indirect interactions, as
well as on the last historical report of the RSU. The latter will be taken more or
less into account depending on its freshness. In other words, we use the report’s
reception time (T0) with the current time (T) to compute its importance factor
T0
T . Then, the global trust evaluation (GTR) given by a node i to another node530
j is updated using equation 7:














In addition, if the new global trust evaluation GTR(i, j) increases compared
to its previous value, a positive recommendation about the node j is automati-
cally broadcasted. In the other hand, if GTR(i, j) decreases bellow a predefined
threshold a negative recommendation is broadcasted.535
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4.4. ETSI-based trust establishment
In the facilities layer defined in the ETSI standard, the main components
are the CAM and DENM basic services.
Cooperative awareness within road traffic means that road users and the
roadside infrastructure are informed about each other’s position, dynamics and540
attributes. Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) are exchanged in the ITS
network between ITS-Ss (Intelligent Transportation System-Stations) to create
and maintain awareness of each other, and to support cooperative performance
in the road network [39]. In addition, ETSI ITS has defined a ”Basic Set of
Applications” where the Road Hazard Warning (RHW) application is composed545
of multiple use cases. Those applications are supported by the decentralized
environmental notification (DENM) basic service [40].
In this work we take advantage of these messages (CAMs and DENMs)
to continuously, and in a distributed manner, estimate the traffic density, the
existence of dishonest nodes within road segments, and the trust-level associated550
to different events and their dissemination.
Involved modules in this phase are shown in figure 6
4.4.1. Segments’ trust and traffic estimation
To estimate the degree of trust and the traffic density between two road
junctions in a collaborative and distributed manner, we use three information555
sources: the total Number of Front and Rear Nodes (NFN, NRN), the rate of
Trusted Front and Rear Nodes (TFN/TRN), and the Minimum Trust of Nodes
in the Front and Rear (Min(TFN)/Min(TRN)).
We used the trusted nodes rate (TFN and TRN) in addition to the total
number of nodes (NFN and NRN) to have a clear idea about the traffic den-560
sity. Furthermore, in the message forwarding process, untrusted vehicles will be
avoided because they behave as blackholes dropping messages.
The Minimum trust values (Min(TFN), Min(TRN)) are used to know the
dishonest nodes distribution within the road segments.
24
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Figure 6: Events’ trust, segments’ trust, and traffic estimation modules.
Figure 7 represents a numerical example of such information carried by a565
vehicle labeled as A.
For fields Min(TFN) and Min(TRN), a value of 1 would only take place if
all vehicles in a specific segment have a special role (e.g. police, ambulance),
but this situation is not realistic, and so a value of 1 will never be reached
(minimum trust will always be less than 1). A similar value can be achieved if570
all nodes within a segment consider each other trusted vehicles (trusted vehicles
ratio = 1). In addition, every node i associates the previously computed trust
value GTR(i, j) to each neighbor (see section 4.3).
We chose to take advantage of CAM messages [39] by adding our security-
related fields. This allows us to estimate the trust, the traffic density, and575
the dishonest nodes distribution within a road segment. More specifically, we
extend the high frequency container since information within this container
is continuously updated, which is also the case for traffic density and the trust
values of nodes. The new format contains the previously mentioned information:






Information carried by the CAM message of vehicle A 
NFN TFN Min(TFN) NRN TRN Min(TRN) 
2 0.5 0.2 2 1 0.8 
Trust table of vehicle A 





Figure 7: An example of traffic density and segment’s trust information.
Front and Rear nodes (TFN/TRN), and the Minimum Trust at Front and Rear
(Min(TFN)/Min(TRN)), as illustrated in figure 8.
In particular, to optimize the length of our fields, we represent the float
information (TFN, TRN, Min(TFN), Min(TRN)) using only one byte. For
example, if the Trusted Nodes Rate in the rear (TRN) is 0.99, carried value in585
TRN will be (99)2.
Nodes maintain local information about their one-hop neighbors to perform
trust and traffic density estimations. For the traffic estimation, the maintained
fields are: (i) ’MyNFN’ and ’MyNRN’, which store the total number of one
hop front/rear neighbors; (ii) ’MyTFN’ and ’MyTRN’, that store the ratio of590
trusted one hop front/rear neighbors; and (iii) ’Min(TFN) and ’Min(TRN)’, for
the minimum trust in one hop front/rear neighbors.
Upon receiving a CAM message from the front or rear sides, the vehicles com-
pare it with their own neighborhood information. The goal of this comparison
is to gather accurate and precise information about the segment, meaning that595
this information will be used later on by vehicles located at junctions to choose
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Figure 8: Additional Fields.
hop for unicast data messages.
For more accuracy, every node i only takes into account messages coming
from its farthest trusted neighbor j both at front and rear to select the most600
accurate and fresh information, updating its current security metrics following
algorithm 2.
When a vehicle ’i’ located within a road segment receives a CAM message
broadcasted by another node ’j’ located at its front/rear, it computes: the
number of front/rear vehicles, the front/rear trusted vehicles ratio, and the605
minimum trust value of front/rear vehicles. Since we take into account just
CAMs coming from trusted nodes ’j’, these last can be located near to the
receiver node ’i’. Hence, to avoid re-counting common neighbors we used the
’cardinal’ function.
In the other hand, if the vehicle ’i’ is located within a junction, it associates610
a weight called SW (”Segment Weight”) for every segment ’k’, this weight is
computed using the received traffic and trust information from vehicles located
in segment ’k’, and it will be used later on to choose the most adequate path in
the message routing process.
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Algorithm 2 Segments’ trust and traffic estimation
1: INPUTS: CAM messages broadcasted by j and received by i.
2: OUTPUTS: updated CAM for i; segments’ weights computed.
3: Upon receiving the estimation fields from j by i;
4: if (i is located within a road segment) then (see figure 2 in-segment part)
5: if (j in front of i) then
6: NFN(i) ← MyNFN + NFN(j) - [Card(one hop Front Neighbors of i
∩ Front Neighbors of j)];
7: TFN(i)← MyTFN + TFN(j) - [Card (one hop Trusted Front Neigh-
bors of i ∩ Trusted Front Neighbors of j)];
8: Min(TFN) ← Min [MyMin(TFN), Min(TFN)(j)];
9: else (j in rear of i)
10: NRN(i) ← MyNRN + NRN(j) - [Card(one hop Rear Neighbors of i
∩ Rear Neighbors of j)];
11: TRN(i)← MyTRN + TRN(j) - [Card (one hop Trusted Rear Neigh-
bors of i ∩ Trusted Rear Neighbors of j)];
12: Min(TRN) ← Min [MyMin(TRN), Min(TRN)(j)];
13: end if
14: else (i is located within a junction, see figure 2 in-junction part)
15: ∀ k ∈ { A, B, C}
16: if (The vehicle in ’k’ is entering the junction) then
17: SWk ← NFNVk · TFNVk · Min(TFN)Vk ;
18: else (The vehicle in ’k’ is leaving the junction)




4.4.2. Event trust and trusted alert dissemination615
DENM messages are mainly used by cooperative Road Hazard Warning













Alacarte Container  
(Optional) 
Figure 9: DENM format.
operative RHW application is an event-based application composed of five con-
tainers, where two of them are mandatory (ITS PDU header and Management
Container), and the other three are optional (Situation Container, Location620
Container, and Alacarte container). For more details about these containers,
please refer to [40].
In addition to the ITS PDU Header container, in this work we focus on the
management, and the situation containers (see Figure 9).
In the Management container, some event-related information is defined in-625
cluding the traffic direction, the validity duration and the relevance distance
representing the maximum distance beyond which DENMs should not be dis-
seminated. This important information will be used in the dissemination part
in addition to the computation of DENM similarities.
For the situation container, the application layer provides an information630
quality value varying from 0 to 7 representing the event’s message effectiveness.
A classification of events, along with a set of 99 event-related causes, are also
available in the standard, which can improve the similarity evaluation [40].
Generally, the trust given to a specific event is related to the level of honesty
associated to the event report originator. In addition, some context-based infor-635
mation may be used to ensure reliable event report dissemination. For example,
we can decide not to accept notifications about ice on the road when having a
temperature superior to 20, or that a road is congested from midnight to 6 a.m
in normal situations. To this end, DENM messages contain fields describing the
reported event in a clear and precise manner.640
Operations that can be done on these messages are three: triggering, updat-
ing and termination of the event. While the first two are a task of the originator
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node, the third one includes cancelation and negation, and it can be done by
any intermediate node.
Unlike nodes’ trust, the event’s trust (ETR) is a value computed on the fly645
for a specific event. In our case, this value is computed using the originator
global trust (GTR) and the event credibility through the received information
quality (from the situation container). Then, if the event’s trust is higher than a
predefined threshold, a validity test is done on the DENM before rebroadcasting
it; otherwise, it is dropped. In addition, if node i decides to rebroadcast node650
j’s event messages, it increases its message quality Qmsg(i, j), decreasing it
otherwise since this communication is considered a direct interaction. Algorithm
3 describes the proposed trust-based DENM dissemination process:
Algorithm 3 Trust-aware DEN messages dissemination process
1: INPUTS: Alert of an event ’E’ sent by a node j (DENM message).
2: OUTPUTS: Direct interaction evaluation; relay or drop the alert.
3: Upon receiving a DENM;
4: ETR(E, j) ← ρ· InfoQuality(E)+(1-ρ)·GTR(i, j);
5: if (ETR(E, j) ≥ TrustToSend) then
6: Qmsg(i, j) ← Qmsg(i, j)+δ;






13: Qmsg(i, j) ← Qmsg(i, j)-µ;
14: end if
15: End
In the case of DENM messages, and since we focus on safety situations, we
give more importance to the event information quality than to its originator’s655
trust. This is achieved by multiplying it by the message credibility factor (ρ),
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which is in the range 0.7 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, thereby insuring that message credibility has
always a higher impact. The event information quality (InfoQuality(E)) is a
field included within every generated DENM representing the credibility of the
reported event E; for more details please refer to [40].660
In addition, we consider DENM’s information as a vector A of n elements.
Every element represents the value of specific information parameters. For in-
stance: A[1] = event latitude, A[2] = event longitude, A[3] = validity duration,
etc. Then, for every pair of sources (Vj, Vk), we perform an offline computa-
tion of the similarities between DENMs describing the same event, but coming665
from different sources Vj. Finally, common sources in all inadequate similarities
have their trust level decreased. By comparing information carried by periodical
CAM messages to the RSU, the latter will be able to detect whether trusted
nodes within a road segment are more or less numerous than malicious ones.
Based on this information, it decreased the RSU historical trust (HRSU) of670
vehicles with low similarity values. Algorithm 4 summarizes this process:
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Algorithm 4 Events reporters honesty using DENMs similarity
1: INPUTS: A set of nodes V i reporting a same event.
2: OUTPUTS: Historical RSU-to-vehicle trust updated.
3: For every pair of event reporters (Vj, Vk) do;
4: Similarity(Vj, Vk) ← 1∑n
i=0
(AV j [i]−AV k[i])2
;
5: if Vj and Vk reports are not similar then
6: Increment (Counter of Vj low similarities);
7: Increment (Counter of Vk low similarities);
8: end if
9: if TFN|TRN ≥ NFN|NRN/2 then (there are more trusted than dishonest
nodes)
10: if (Vj appearance frequency ≥ NFN|NRN/2) then
11: HRSU(j)← HRSU(j)-µ;
12: end if
13: else (there are more dishonest nodes than trusted ones)





AV j and AV k are the vectors representing the DENM’s information of vehi-
cles j and ’k’, respectively.
5. Trusted communication and data routing
In addition to the continuous trust and traffic estimation, our additional675
fields carried by CAM messages allows in-junction and in-segment nodes to
collaborate with each other to choose the most suitable path to the destination
whenever data must be delivered (see figure 2).
Involved modules in this last phase are shown in figure 10
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Figure 10: Trusted communication and data routing modules.
Upon receiving a data message, node i checks the source’s trustfulness GTR(i,680
source). If it is lower than the predefined ’TrustToSend’ threshold, the message
will be dropped; otherwise, the forwarding process continues. Then, if vehicle
i is the end destination, it performs data verification on the received message.
This verification allows evaluating the senders’ behavior based on the quality of
its message. If node i is just an intermediate node, we distinguish two cases:685
• In-segment case: if the position of i is within a segment, it has to select as
the next hop the most trusted, stable and close to the destination/junction
node among its neighbors.
• In-junction case: if the position of i is within a junction, it has to select the
most trusted and close segment to the destination to forward the message690
through it.
Algorithm 5 summarizes the data delivery process:
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Algorithm 5 Trust-aware inter-vehicular communication
1: INPUTS: Data message sent/forwarded by j to i.
2: OUTPUTS: Data message accepted/dropped; Direct trust updated; Best path selected .
3: When a data message from ’source’ is received by i;
4: if (GTR(i, Source) ≥ TrustToSend ) then
5: if (End destination is i) then
6: Data verification (msg);
7: if (legal (msg) ) then
8: Qmsg(i, Source) ← Qmsg(i, Source)+δ;
9: else
10: Qmsg(i, Source) ← Qmsg(i, Source)-µ;
11: end if
12: else
13: if (Destination is a neighbor of i) then
14: Deliver (’msg’ to destination);
15: else (i is an intermediate node)
16: if (i is an In-segment node) then
17: For every neighbor ’k’ of i
18: if (Destination in segment) then
19: Score(k) ← GTR(i,k)·LD(i,k)
Distance(k,destination)
;
20: else (Destination out of segment)




23: Transfer (’msg’ to ’k’ having max score);
24: else (i is an In-junction node)
25: For every segment ’k’;
26: Score(k) ← SW (k)
Distance(junction,destination)through′k′ ;




31: else (low trust GTR(i, source))
32: Drop (msg);
33: end if
δ, µ are the trust increment and decrement factors. We take δ  µ since
peer trust is difficult to build up but easy to tear down.
’SW’ is the segment weight computed in the continuous trust and traffic695
estimation presented in the previous section. LD(i, k) is an estimation of the
link duration between the two nodes i and k, and it is computed as follows:








Case 2. Case 1. 
k 




|V (i)−V (k)| V (i) ≥ V (k)
R−d
|V (i)−V (k)| V (i) < V (k)
Where V (i) is the velocity of i, R is the communication range, and d is700
the distance between i and k.
• In the case of two vehicles moving in opposite directions:
LD(i, k) = |L+X||V (i)−V (k)|
Where L =
√
R2 − (yi − yk)2; X = xi − xk; L = distance(A,B) and
X = Distance(A, k) (see figure 11).705
6. Performance evaluation
To evaluate our Trust establishment scheme we relied on the NS-2 simulator
[41]. The generated vehicular traffic is based on the Citymob mobility model
[42], which uses SUMO [43] to create mobility traces based on real maps ex-
tracted from OpenStreetMap. In our case we used a map from the downtown710
area of Valencia, Spain (see figure 12).
Table 2 summarizes the main simulation parameters:
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Figure 12: Simulated scenario of Valencia city, Spain.
Table 2: Simulation parameters.
Parameters Value
Simulation area (km×km) 2×2
Transmission range(m) 300
Permissible lane speed (km/h) [0,80]
Number of vehicles [0,400]
State cars percentage (fully trusted) (%) 2







Trust increment and decrement factors (δ, µ) are the same as in [13], while
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the values of α, β, RL and ρ are chosen in such a way so as to achieve the best
possible performance based on a large set of experiments.715
In addition, we assume that we have 6 RSUs randomly distributed. 10 events
occur at random simulation times. Moreover, vehicles can exchange unicast data
messages. To avoid consuming too many resources, and considering that trust
variations do not require a higher refresh rate, we have adopted a frequency
of 0.5 Hz for our extended CAM messages, possibly extending only 1 message720
every 2 seconds with trust information, while CAM messages are transmitted
at the typical 10 Hz rate.
We divide our performance evaluation section into two parts: (i) Impact on
network performance when compared to an insecure routing protocol; and (ii)
Security performance, describing the achieved security results when compared725
to other existing works.
6.1. Network performance
In this part we discuss the impact of establishing trust on the network re-
sources in terms of: average end-to-end delay, packet delivery ratio, and network
overhead. We compare our proposal against both secure and insecure versions730
of the GyTAR routing protocol [26, 25], in the presence of 20% of nodes acting
as blackholes.
Figure 13 shows that, except for cases of very low node density, our proposal
performs better than both GyTAR versions, delivering packets to their end
destinations with a reduced delay, typically not exceeding a second if the number735
of vehicles is higher than 200.
Similarly to the Average end-to-end delay, our solution can ensure a high
efficiency in terms of packet delivery ratio, approaching optimal values whenever
a fully connected network is available (see figure 14)
In terms of additional overhead, figure 15 shows that our solution is injecting740
an acceptable load into the network, being lower than the one introduced by
the GyTAR protocol. Notice that, since our solution is based on the standard,








































Figure 13: Average end-to-end delay of unicast data messages.
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Figure 15: Generated Overhead.
means that the overhead introduced is mainly due to RSU reports and trusted
nodes recommendations.745
6.2. Security performance
In this part we study the achieved security results of our proposal when com-
pared to the T-CLAIDS [14] and the AESFV [15] trust establishment schemes,
in addition to the secure version of the GyTAR protocol (S-GyTAR) [25]. The
comparison will be in terms of dishonest vehicles detection ratios and percent-750
age of wrong decisions. Moreover, we analyse the impact of deactivating some
elements of our security architecture on performance results.
6.2.1. Dishonest nodes detection efficiency
In this part we discuss the ability of our proposal to detect dishonest nodes
compared to other existing solutions. To this purpose we fix the number of nodes755
within the network at 300, and configure 30% of them to behave maliciously.
Figure 16 shows that our system has detected nearly 97% of the existing
dishonest nodes in about 200s, while AECFV requires 25% additional time to








































Figure 16: Dishonest nodes detection ability during 300s of simulation time.
to the ability to estimate the distribution of dishonest nodes in our system.760
Concerning the S-GyTAR and T-CLAIDS protocols, they achieve poorer per-
formance levels.
In the second scenario we study the system scalability. With this purpose
we vary the number of nodes within the network from 100 to 400 nodes, where
30% of them have a malicious behavior (33% keep sending messages at a high765
rate, 33% drop all received packets, and 33% send false alerts). In addition,
dishonest nodes broadcast only positive reports about each other.
Similarly to the dishonest nodes detection results (see figure 16), T-VNets is
able to maintain its resilience even in the presence of a high number of nodes,
offering performance results comparable to those of the AECFV protocol, and770
performing much better than the two other solutions (see figure 17). This
detection stability is mainly due to the cooperation among nodes, which means
more information is handled to the RSUs and, therefore, more accurate decisions
can be made.
The last scenario analysed measures the resilience of our proposal when775












































Figure 17: Dishonest nodes detection for different densities.
upon AECFV in the presence of a high ratio of dishonest nodes. This is mostly
due to the fact that AECFV has no previous estimation about the ratio of
dishonest nodes and their distribution within the network, contrarily to our
proposal.780
6.2.2. Dishonest nodes detection accuracy
Similarly to any security system for mobile and distributed networks, the
existing solutions are prone to trigger some false positives when detecting dis-
honest nodes.
To evaluate the impact of this problem we varied the dishonest nodes ra-785
tio over a total of 300 nodes, studying how many honest nodes are wrongly
considered dishonest at the end of the simulation.
Figure 19 shows that, in the detection process, T-VNets generates about
4.7% of false positives when half of the nodes are dishonest; this is generally
due to their presence in a zone containing a high ratio of dishonest nodes, or790
because they have relayed some malicious messages coming from these dishonest
nodes. This is prone to occur right at the beginning of an experiment, when













































Figure 18: Dishonest nodes detection effectiveness when varying their number.
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Figure 20: The different trust metrics’ impacts.
provide improvements compared to the three other solutions (see figure 19).
6.2.3. Trust metrics impact795
Finally, we discuss the impact of the different trust metrics used. We vary
the number of node used from 50 to 400, with 30% of them behaving maliciously,
and compare our protocol against other three slimmed-down versions of itself:
• T-VNets: this version shows the performance of our full proposal.
• NoRSU : it shows the performance of T-VNets when no RSUs are available.800
• NoDirectT : it shows the performance achieved when direct trust metrics
are not used. Unlike the other versions, this one is computed after 100s
of simulation time since trust will never be updated if there are no inter-
actions among nodes.
• NoIndirectT : it shows the performance achieved when no recommenda-805
tions are exchanged among nodes.
Figure 20 shows that the key element in T-VNets is the use of direct trust





























Figure 21: Generated Overhead by T-VNets different versions.
direct trust). As a result, we find that it is possible to reduce the generated
overhead (see figure 21) by reducing the number of recommendations since the810
impact of the latter is reduced compared to the other metrics.
7. Conclusions and future work
Trust establishment in high dynamic mobile networks is a complex task due
to the many challenges involved. Moreover, important standardization efforts
have been made in the past years concerning VANET communications. Thus,815
to be readily deployable, proposed trust and security solutions should take the
existing standards into account and try to take advantage of them whenever
possible.
In this work we presented T-VNets, a trust establishment architecture for
VANETs based on ETSI ITS standard messaging services. Our solution can820
offer high security levels while preserving network resources. The continuous
traffic and trust estimations using CAM messages allows to quickly detect dif-
ferent types of active attacks, thereby avoiding untrusted paths when performing
messages relaying. By evaluating event reports carried by DENM messages, our
44
proposal is able to enhance real-time alert dissemination processes, filtering-out825
non-existent or selfish alerts. In addition, our proposal accounts for direct trust,
indirect trust, and RSU trust evaluations, while also considering official vehicles
that offer full reliability.
Simulation results performed in realistic downtown scenarios have shown
that, compared to existing works, our proposal is able to ensure high detection830
ratios with a low number of false positives, while preserving network resources
from being exhausted.
In the future we plan to implement our proposal on mobile devices and test it
in real life situations. Moreover, we plan to add other security metrics to achieve
more robustness, and adapt the proposal to other international standards as835
well.
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[20] F. G. Mármol, G. M. Pérez, Trip, a trust and reputation infrastructure-
based proposal for vehicular ad hoc networks, Journal of Network and
Computer Applications 35 (3) (2012) 934–941.905
[21] X. Li, J. Liu, X. Li, W. Sun, Rgte: A reputation-based global trust estab-
lishment in vanets, in: Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems
(INCoS), 2013 5th International Conference on, IEEE, 2013, pp. 210–214.
[22] Y.-M. Chen, Y.-C. Wei, A beacon-based trust management system for en-
hancing user centric location privacy in vanets, Communications and Net-910
works, Journal of 15 (2) (2013) 153–163.
[23] A. Jesudoss, S. K. Raja, A. Sulaiman, Stimulating truth-telling and coop-
eration among nodes in vanets through payment and punishment scheme,
Ad Hoc Networks 24 (2015) 250–263.
[24] R. S. Bali, N. Kumar, Secure clustering for efficient data dissemination915
in vehicular cyberphysical systems, Future Generation Computer Systems
(2015) –doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2015.09.004.
[25] T. Bouali, E.-H. Aglzim, S.-M. Senouci, A secure intersection-based rout-
ing protocol for data collection in urban vehicular networks, in: Global
Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2014 IEEE, IEEE, 2014, pp.920
82–87.
[26] M. Jerbi, S.-M. Senouci, T. Rasheed, Y. Ghamri-Doudane, Towards effi-
cient geographic routing in urban vehicular networks, Vehicular Technology,
IEEE Transactions on 58 (9) (2009) 5048–5059.
[27] H. Gong, L. Yu, X. Zhang, Social contribution-based routing protocol for925
vehicular network with selfish nodes, International Journal of Distributed
Sensor Networks 2014 (2014) 700–705.
[28] H. Sedjelmaci, S. M. Senouci, M. A. Abu-Rgheff, An efficient and
lightweight intrusion detection mechanism for service-oriented vehicular
networks, Internet of Things Journal, IEEE 1 (6) (2014) 570–577.930
48
[29] R. A. Shaikh, A. S. Alzahrani, Intrusion-aware trust model for vehicular ad
hoc networks, Security and communication networks 7 (11) (2014) 1652–
1669.
[30] A. Ltifi, A. Zouinkhi, M. S. Bouhlel, A cooperation based scheme for man-
aging alert propagation in vanet, Wireless Personal Communications (2015)935
1–21.
[31] K. C. Abdelaziz, N. Lagraa, A. Lakas, Trust model with delayed verifi-
cation for message relay in vanets, in: Wireless Communications and Mo-
bile Computing Conference (IWCMC), 2014 International, IEEE, 2014, pp.
700–705.940
[32] N. Haddadou, A. Rachedi, Y. Ghamri-Doudane, A job market signaling
scheme for incentive and trust management in vehicular ad hoc networks,
Vehicular Technology, IEEE Transactions on 64 (8) (2015) 3657–3674.
[33] K. Rostamzadeh, H. Nicanfar, N. Torabi, S. Gopalakrishnan, V. Leung, A
context-aware trust-based information dissemination framework for vehic-945
ular networks, Internet of Things Journal, IEEE 2 (2) (2015) 121–132.
[34] O. Punal, C. Pereira, A. Aguiar, J. Gross, Experimental characterization
and modeling of rf jamming attacks on vanets, Vehicular Technology, IEEE
Transactions on 64 (2) (2015) 524–540.
[35] N. Lyamin, A. V. Vinel, M. Jonsson, J. Loo, Real-time detection of denial-950
of-service attacks in ieee 802.11 p vehicular networks., IEEE Communica-
tions letters 18 (1) (2014) 110–113.
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